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bstract
Economic liberalisation is characterised by the entry of foreign companies and the emergence of new domestic institutions to compete with the
xisting institutions of lending, and there is a view that the process leads to greater efficiency, especially because foreign banks bring new expertise.
xtracting information from accounts lodged with Ghana Central Bank, this paper ranks the cost efficiency of banks, Theil decomposition of the
ost efficiency scores allows for a comparison of performance between banks under different types of ownership. There is pronounced differences
n efficiency scores within and between groups by type of ownership, but foreign ownership, per se, is not the determining factor.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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. Introduction
Financial liberalisation entails diversity in ownership and
overnance structures of banks, and we are concerned with com-
aring the efficiency of different ownership structures. However,
iberalisation has taken different forms in different countries
ecause the model of perfect competition underlying the idea of
ull liberalisation does not apply to banking. There are different
ypes of liberalisation requiring different ways of measuring the
uccess of reform carried out within the constraints of the par-
icular type of liberalisation under consideration.1 Comparison
f efficiency between different types of banks becomes country
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1248 382171.
E-mail addresses: elvis908@yahoo.com (E.A. Adjei),.p.chakravarty@bangor.ac.uk (S.P. Chakravarty).
1 For example, liberalisation in the United States had meant the repeal of
he Glass-Steagal Act restricting the range of activities a bank could carry out
Ibanez et al., 2010).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
fricagrowth Institute.
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pecific. We are concerned with measures of bank efficiency in
ost-liberalisation Ghana.
Efficiency and productivity are problematic concepts
Saraydar, 1989; Uddin and Hopper, 2003) and they are dou-
ly problematic in the service sector. For example, an industry
ight be characterised by firms that make best use of inputs,
ithin the constraints of extant knowledge, in production with-
ut making any further advances on new methods of production
r delivery. The problem is further complicated in the service
ector where inputs and outputs cannot always be clearly delin-
ated, and this further difficulty is highlighted in the literature on
ank performance. Assets of banks are the deposits and loans,
oans are re-deposited, and deposits are lent out again. Notwith-
tanding these difficulties, there is consensus in the literature
bout certain particular indicators of efficiency which might
elp in the conduct of informed policy debate about the inter-
ediation role of banks. Being concerned with the debate about
nancial sector liberalisation, this paper focuses on the banking
ndustry.
The intermediation approach to modelling bank production
osits that banks mediate between depositors and borrowers.
rom this perspective, a bank purchases inputs (deposits) in
rder to generate earning assets (loans) as output (Sealey and
indley, 1977), and adding value in the process.
The attainment of full allocative efficiency in a free mar-
et entails that risk-adjusted interest rates equalise risk-adjusted
eturns across all borrowers and lenders. Market efficiency, as
hat concept is understood above, is inadequate to capture gains
nd losses to the economy from liberalisation if either there are
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nteractions between industries and second best problems arise
r there is information deficiency in market contracts.2
Competition can increase even when reform of the financial
ector is carried out within the context of an industrial strat-
gy for the allocation of funds, as was done in South Korea
Amsden and Euh, 1993).3 To study the impact of liberalisation
n the efficiency of banks, it may be fruitful to examine “func-
ional efﬁciency, [measured as] the productivity of the delivery
f financial services” (Amsden and Euh, 1993:387). Increase
n competition is a likely factor in reducing cost of delivery
Mahesh and Bhide, 2008), but there may be institution-specific
onstrains on the outcome reflecting differences in ownership
tructure.4
The process by which reforms in the banking system may
ontribute to cost efficiency is outlined by Jae Yoon Park
1988:13) narrating the Korean experience (quoted in Amsden
nd Euh (1993:387):
“The managers and employees of financial institutions have
acquired more of a competitive spirit. They have become
very sensitive to the earnings and expenses of financial
institutions . . .These may be considered the most important
performance-effects that the first round of liberalization has
achieved.”
Our paper examines the distribution of cost efficiency
mongst Ghanaian banks during the period 1997–2008, when
he initial impacts of the reform process that started in 1986
ere bedded down. Data that are available for banks are pooled
ogether and grouped by ownership criteria and also by a two
ategory entry period, those that were already established in
he pre-liberalisation period before 1986 and those that entered
ubsequently.5
There is a view, for example the view informing the
arasimham Committee (Narasimham Committee Report,
991) constituted by the Reserve Bank of India to advise on
nancial sector liberalisation in that country, that the entry of
oreign banks and the emergence of new domestic private banks
ntroduce better management techniques in the banking indus-
ry. There is no consensus about how long it might take for these
ew techniques to be impounded within the entire industry and
2 The problem of externality is an important but neglected area of research
n the literature on bank liberalisation with some notable exceptions (e.g. Stein,
010). Banks have a greater external impact on other sectors of the economy than
ost other firms, but this externality is not picked up in conventional measures
f efficiency deriving from the literature in industrial economics. For example,
tein (2010) argues that privatised banks in some countries have withdrawn
rom providing services to the small and medium sized industries because the
nformation cost is greater but the cost to the economy of depriving funds to
hese sectors is high. Thus the issue about how to measure bank efficiency is not
settled question. This is an important issue but it is outside the scope of this
aper.
3 Amsden and Euh (1993) is a study of the impact of banking sector reform in
outh Korea where the state did not fully distance itself from lending decisions.
4 Increase in competition in banking which may reduce cost of delivery is not
o be conflated with increased productivity elsewhere in the economy (Valvarde
t al., 2003).
5 Ownership criteria are explained in the notes following Table 1.
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pinion varies, especially, about the desirable pace of reduction
n barriers to foreign competition (Joseph and Nitsure, 2002).
way of examining the impact of liberalisation on efficiency
s to examine whether the new entrants as a group have brought
ore cost efficient practices into the banking system which per-
ist even after some years to distinguish the performance of these
roups of banks from the rest. This is one aspect of our study.
Another aspect is an examination of the importance of owner-
hip structure, for example whether private ownership continues
o lead to greater pressure for cost efficiency than public
wnership even some years after liberalisation when public
ector banks are granted greater commercial autonomy, and
inority equity holdings in these banks are traded in the bourse.
To examine the distribution of cost efficiency amongst banks,
cost efficiency frontier is estimated. The distance of a bank
rom this frontier can be regarded as a proxy for managerial
lack, a measure of inefficiency, in that bank. Efficiency is mea-
ured as the corollary, closeness to the frontier.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
ackground to financial liberalisation in Ghana, and outlines
he data. Section 3 explains how the cost efficient frontier is
stimated and distance from the frontier is calculated for banks.
ection 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
. Background
The shift in thinking in development economics in favour of
reater emphasis on the market began to make a mark on the
irection of economic policy in Ghana in the 1980s. The reform
f the financial sector, which began in 1986, was an inevitable
omponent of the policy of embracing the market. Ever since the
eforms were implemented in the Ghanaian banking industry, the
nflux of privately-owned banks (both domestic and foreign) has
ncreased steadily.
Before the reforms began in 1986, there were only 11 banks
perating in the economy, of which four had foreign equity par-
icipation. Foreign participation was limited to 60% of total
quity by an indigenisation decree passed in 1975. The gov-
rnment acquired 40% of equity stake in hitherto fully-owned
ubsidiaries of foreign banks. Since the start of reforms, the gov-
rnment has sold its minority shares in these banks. To distance
overnment from financial markets further, government’s equity
takes in the public sector banks have been diluted by sale to the
ublic through listing in the stock exchange.6
As of December 2008, there were 25 deposit taking banks in
peration, of which 13 were foreign-owned and 9 were under
omestic private ownership. Three banks remained in the pub-
ic sector. Whilst the pressure of public opinion has exerted
restraint on privatising fully the remaining stake of govern-
ent in the public sector banks, there has been considerable
ntry, exit and re-structuring of institutions. A number of banks,
oth in the public and private sector and some of them even
6 One of these institutions (Social Security Bank) was eventually merged and
cquired domestically and subsequently merger with and acquisition by a foreign
ank.
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Table 1
Bank type.
Group Description Number of
observations
A Private sector banks under domestic
ownership in existence prior to liberalisation.
12
B Private sector banks under foreign ownership
in existence prior to liberalisation.
24
C Public sector banks. 36
D Domestically owned private sector banks
that have emerged since liberalisation.
74
E Foreign banks that have entered the market 68
f
T
i
s
a
f
c
s
r
2
l
G
F
t
i
c
r
b
t
p
p
y
a
c
c
c
i
o
t
a
t
5
i
G
w
o
h
b
1
p
a
B
e
i
f
a
s
a
T
a
i
2
i
b
f
b
o
t
l
S
d
b
g
i
3
p
t
i
s
t
(
f
e
e
Tby setting up on their own since
liberalisation.
oreign owned, have either been recapitalised or liquidated.
here has also been balance sheet restructuring and changes
n management and operating procedures in distressed public
ector banks for them to be able to survive under the new liber-
lised regime. This regime is characterised by greater autonomy
or management coupled with greater responsibility for the out-
ome of commercial decisions.7 The prudential regulation and
upervisory systems have been strengthened. Unlike the expe-
ience of some of the former communist countries (Dow et al.,
008), there has not been increase in the share of non-performing
oans in lending decisions.
The Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) in
hana was carried out in three phases across time, namely
INSAP-1 which covered the period 1988–1991; FINSAP-2 for
he period 1992–1995; and FINSAP-3 which started in 1995, and
t is an ongoing process. The first two periods witnessed radical
hange in direction of economic policy in Ghana. Many of the
adical restructuring of the banking system had been completed
y the start of our study period in 1997.
The entry of banks under different types of ownership invites
he question as to whether the different methods of cost control
ursued by different types of banks rub into the management
ractices across types of ownership. For the purposes of our anal-
sis, banks are categorised into the following groups (Table 1)
nd their intra-group and inter-group differences in cost effi-
iency are examined. The number of pooled time series and
ross section data available for each type of bank is also indi-
ated in the table. The five types of banks are further re-grouped
nto domestic (groups A plus D) and foreign (groups B plus E)
wnership for further analysis.8
7 Mergers and acquisitions do not appear to have been the focus of restruc-
uring the banking system. Only one domestic and cross-border mergers and
cquisitions has been recorded since the reforms took place.
8 A bank is defined by the Bank of Ghana to be foreign owned when more
han 50% of shares are held by overseas entities. Likewise, when more than
0% of outstanding equity of a bank is held in domestic private hands, the bank
s classified as a domestic private sector bank. One of the banks, SG-SSB, in
roup E is a foreign owned bank by the above definition, but the ownership
as acquired by taking over a domestic entity. The capital structure of the state
wned banks are in tradable equity, but with more than 50% in government
and. Ghana Commercial Bank is classified in our dataset as a state-owned
ank although majority participation in equity were offered to the public in
996, but re-estimation of the model with changed classification does not alter
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Data for this period on banks that existed before the reform
rocess started and new entrants, both foreign and domestic,
re collected through private communication from the Central
ank, but we do not have information for the entire period for
ach bank. The balance sheet and income statement of Ghana-
an banks, on which our data are based, are not readily available
rom commercial sources. The dataset available to us is an unbal-
nced panel covering 25 banks over the period 1997–2008 with a
ample size of 214 observations. The bank-level data is unbal-
nced because new entry has taken place in the wake of reforms.
wo state-owned banks were liquidated during our data period,
nd they are not included in the study. The number of banks
ncluded in our study varies from 14 in 1997 to 24 banks in
008. These are all engaged in some form of commercial bank-
ng, amongst other activities, and can be regarded as universal
anks. Other financial institutions engaged in lending activity,
or example rural banks, have been excluded from this study
ecause they operate under different legislation.
All the development banks in Ghana undertake some form
f commercial banking activities apart from their usual opera-
ions. Institutions that were operating as merchant banks prior to
iberalisation had their license changed into universal banking.
ince 2003, all the three-pillar banking model – commercial,
evelopment and merchant – have been replaced by universal
anking. In light of this, data available for banks in the cate-
ories of commercial, development and merchant have all been
ncluded in the study.
. Cost efﬁcient frontier
Much attention has been devoted in the literature over the
ast few decades to the study of the efficiency of financial insti-
utions. Banking institutions, insofar as they pool risk, operate
n an oligopolistic market which is also characterised by its own
pecial kind of information constraints. There is potential for
he existence of X-inefficiency, a term coined by Leibenstein
1966), in institutions where employees (managers) cannot be
ully monitored. This has given rise to research in industrial
conomics comparing individual firms against a ‘best practice’
fficient frontier (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Fries and
aci, 2005). Managerial slack, or X-inefficiency, is measured
y distance from the efficient frontier.
Cost efficiency is measured by estimating a cost function
hich describes the relationship between a cost variable as
he dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables that
nclude output(s), input prices, and proxies for differences in the
conomic and regulatory environment, random error, and ineffi-
iency. Thus each bank is benchmarked against the ‘best’ bank
n the sample.We estimate cost efficiency using a stochastic frontier
pproach originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen
nd van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977).
he estimated coefficients of the model and efficiency scores do not change.
lso, the composition of the board of directors did not alter after government
ivested itself of majority equity.
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Table 2
Theil index of dispersion of cost efficiency scores and decomposition into inter-
group and intra-group components for five different groups of banks.
All five groups of banks Inter-group Intra-group
0.014935408 0.00539589 0.009540
Percentage contribution to the total index
100 36.13 63.87
Table 3
The percentage contribution of inter-group and intra-group dispersions to the
total Theil index of dispersion of efficiency scores for binary groups of banks.
Groups Description Inter-group Intra-group
A and B Domestically owned private
and foreign owned banks
existing prior to
liberalisation
90.7 9.3
A and C Domestically owned private
banks existing prior to
liberalisation and public
banks
72.96 27.04
A and D Domestically owned private
banks existing prior to
liberalisation and new
domestically owned
entrants
13.65 86.35
B and D Foreign owned banks
existing prior to
liberalisation and new
domestic entrants
71.20 28.80
B and E Foreign owned banks
existing prior to
liberalisation and new
foreign entrants
12.29 87.71
(A + D) and Domestic ownership versus 27.39 72.61
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general version of the cost function can be expressed in a
ogarithm form:
n Ci = f (Qi, Pi,Ki, Z; β) + ln εi, where i = 1, . . . , N
(3.1)
The variable Ci is the observed variable cost of bank i; f(Qi,
i, Ki, Z; β) is the cost frontier which maps the predicted cost of
cost-minimising bank. On the cost frontier, Qi represents the
ector of banking output for bank i; Pi denotes the vector of input
rices that bank i pays; Ki is the vector of bank i risk indicators.
is the vector of economic and environmental variables that may
nfluence cost performance; β is a vector of unknown parame-
ers to be estimated; and εi is a two-component error term that
xplains the deviation of a banking firm’s observed cost from
he cost-efficient frontier due to a random noise, vi, and possible
nefficiency, ui. Thus,
i = vi + ui (3.2)
here both vi and ui are assumed to be independently and
dentically distributed. The term vi is an independent normal
istribution with zero mean and a variance of σ2v . It captures the
ffects of measurement errors and random effects such as good
nd bad luck that are out of management control but capable
f affecting bank performance. The second stochastic term ui is
ssumed to be non-negative, but it is otherwise independent and
ormally distributed with a positive mean and a variance of σ2u.
his term captures the effects of inefficiency due to management
rror that are specific to the firm. The mean of the conditional
istribution of the inefficiency term ui, given the composite error
erm εi, is the X-inefficiency score in this model. Further manipu-
ation of the algebra allows for an efficiency score to be estimated
or each bank in the sample as a parameter in this model. The
core is bounded by 0 and 1, where a score of unity represents
est practice. The software Frontier 4.1 developed by Coelli
1996) is used here. Efficiency scores are estimated following
n algorithm proposed earlier (Battese and Coelli, 1992).
Data for banks is available for the period 1997–2008, but not
or the entire period for every bank. Estimates of the above effi-
iency scores are reported for each group of banks and expressed
s percentage efficiency (Table 4).9 Further details are contained
n Appendix A.
. Results
The results presented here are the efficiency scores that are
omputed for the five groups of banks categorised by owner-
hip and listed in Section 2 above. As explained in Footnote
, average efficiency scores, grouped by types of banks, are
eported as percentage figures in Table 4 below. The closer is a
roup of banks to the cost minimisation frontier, the higher is the
9 The parameter measuring distance from the efficient frontier that is estimated
ies between zero and unity. For example, if the estimate for a bank is unity, it
ould be reported as 100% efficient, but if the parameter estimate for this bank
s only ½, it would be reported as 50% efficient.
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B
s(B + E) foreign ownership
fficiency score. The regression results used in this exercise are
lso contained in Appendix A. The Theil index for the dispersion
f efficiency scores over the entire banking system is calculated
nd then additively decomposed into inter-group and intra-group
omponents, as explained in Appendix A. The inter-and intra-
roup contributions to the total index of dispersion are listed in
ables 2 and 3 below. It appears that inter-group differences are
ver-shadowed by differences in efficiency within groups when
he entire sample is examined as in Table 2. A more nuanced
tory emerges when a binary comparison is made between bank
ypes as in Table 3. Whilst it is true that domestically owned
rivate banks in existence prior to liberalisation do not do better
r worse as a group than their newer counterparts which started
peration in the wake of liberalisation, the story is not repeated
hen the comparison is made between foreign and domestic
wnership, but only if data are partitioned by time of entry. For
xample, a comparison of A and B, banks that were in existence
rior to liberalisation, suggest that the inter-group differences
y foreign versus domestic ownership dominate the Theil index.
lso, the average efficiency score of B is greater than that of A.
efore jumping to the conclusion that foreign ownership, per
e, leads to greater cost efficiency, based on data partitioned by
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Table 4
Group efficiency scores.
Bank type Efficiency score (%) Theil index
A Existing private domestic 62.37 0.0012
B Existing foreign owned 92.80 0.0018
C Public sector 79.02 0.0019
D New private domestic 69.21 0.0043
E New foreign owned 79.70 0.0228
All Entire sample 76.46 0.0149
A + D All private domestic 68.25 0.0045
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where the subscripts i and t denote the ith bank in the tth time
period.+ E All foreign owned 83.12 0.0190
ime of entry pre- and post-liberalisation, a comparison needs to
e made using a larger dataset containing both the entry period.
When all those that are foreign owned are grouped together
B + E) and then compared with all those that are owned by
he domestic private sector (A + D), within group differences in
fficiency scores come to dominate the total index of dispersion
see Table 3).10 Whatever the advantage that foreign owner-
hip may confer, it is not impossible for it to be impounded by
he domestic banks. It is also interesting to note that historical
aggage notwithstanding, public sector banks can register high
fficiency scores (Table 4) some years after liberalisation and re-
tructuring, and operating with greater commercial autonomy.
. Conclusions
Liberalisation of the banking sector can take different forms
nd the idea of what constitutes reform is not unique. For exam-
le, Amsden and Euh (1993) describes banking reform in Korea
hat did not dispense with an industrial policy directing invest-
ent funds to preferred sectors at lower interest rates. However,
common factor in liberalisation is the reduction of barriers
o entry by both domestic and foreign players and the emer-
ence of competition against public sector banks which are now
llowed greater commercial autonomy. There is diversification
n ownership and governance and the literature suggests that
hese developments have impact on bank efficiency (Fries and
aci, 2005). For example, some authors suggest that foreign
anks possess superior management practices and technolog-
cal advantage over local banks, and as such, are expected to
apitalise on their advantages and exhibit higher efficiency lev-
ls than their local peers (Claessens et al., 2001). All banks
aken together, intra-group variations contribute almost twice
he amount to the dispersion in efficiency than inter-group vari-
tions when banks are grouped by ownership type. However,
ur evidence suggests that time may even out any advantage
f ownership type. Foreign owned banks that existed prior to
iberalisation have, on average, done better than those that came
n the wake of liberalisation, but there is considerable variation in
fficiency within banks under similar ownership type (Table 3).
10 Note that the foreign owned banks as a group (B + E) register higher effi-
iency scores than banks under domestic ownership (A + D), the index of
ispersion is substantially higher for the former.
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ppendix A. The cost function
We use operating cost as dependent variable in our efficiency
odel and proxy this variable as the sum of personnel and other
on-interest expenses.
We specify two outputs (loans and deposits) and two inputs
labour cost and the price of deposits) and the frontier cost
unction model attempts to capture the least cost method of gen-
rating outputs from inputs. With respect to input price variables,
e proxy the price of labour as the ratio of personnel expenses
o total assets,11 whilst the price of deposit is proxied as the
atio of interest expenses to the value of total deposits. This is
n input price that is proxied by the ratio of interest payments to
he amounts of funds purchased. In the case of banks considered
ere, funds purchased by a bank are the deposits placed in the
ank by customers. The operating cost (OCit) in the regression
quation below is deflated by the price of deposits. To capture
he missing time dimension that is not explicitly modelled in the
ost function, we include a time trend variable that accounts for
he effects of technological factors, together with other factors
uch as regulatory changes.
We also include three bank-specific indicators of credit, cap-
tal and liquidity risk to control for differences in risk profile.
hese indicators reflect the variation in the risk-taking strategies
cross banks. We measure credit risk as the ratio of provisions
or bad and doubtful debts to gross loans; capital risk as the ratio
f shareholders’ funds to total assets; and liquidity risk as the
atio of liquid assets to total bank liabilities.
Based on the afore-mentioned variable definitions, we specify
ur preferred cost efficiency model on a two-output, two-input
rans-log functional form. The efficiency estimate is derived
rom a cost function described by the equation below:
n OCit = α0 +
∑
δp ln wit + δL ln LNit + δD ln DPit
+ 1
2
∑∑
δ
PP
(ln wit)2 + 12δLL(ln LNit)
2
+ 1
2
δDD(ln DP)2 + δLD ln LNit ln DPit
+
∑
δ
PL
ln wit ln LNit +
∑
δ
PD
ln wit ln DPit
+
∑
λ
TP
T ln wit + λTLT ln LNit + λTDT ln DPit
+ λT T + 12λTT T
2 + θR1 ln CRDit + θR2 ln CAPit
+ θR3 ln LIQit + vit + uit (A.1.1)11 Total assets comprise cash and short term funds, investments (breakdown into
omponents such as government securities, Bank of Ghana bills etc. is available
nly for some years), loans (including overdrafts) and other assets. This last term
omprise of investment in subsidiaries, plant and real estate including premises
urchased for employee accommodation. Again, the data that has been made
vailable to us does not contain breakdown into components for all banks.
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Table A.1.1 Panel estimation of stochastic cost efficiency frontier.
Variable Parameter Coefficient Standard error T-ratio
Constant α0 5.9192 1.4410 4.1078
ln w δP 0.1520 0.2356 0.6453
ln LN δL 0.2522 0.3261 0.7733
ln DP δD 0.4451 0.4672 0.9527
1/2(ln w)2 δPP 0.1484 0.0328 4.5260
1/2(ln LN)2 δLL 0.0976 0.0196 4.9880
1/2(ln DP)2 δDD 0.1002 0.0587 1.7078
ln LN ln DP δLD −0.0736 0.0255 −2.8928
ln w ln LN δPL 0.0193 0.0328 0.5869
ln w ln DP δPD 0.0054 0.0397 0.1358
T λT 0.2085 0.0917 2.2732
1/2T2 λTT −0.0241 0.0050 −4.8768
T ln w λTP 0.0043 0.0086 0.4949
T ln LN λTL 0.0248 0.0111 2.2469
T ln DP λTD −0.0239 0.0132 −1.8089
CRD θR1 −0.0095 0.0187 −0.5095
CAP θ −0.0341 0.0206 −1.6551
L
a
T
o
t
t
c
a
a
a
d
a
w
t
b
A
s
b
T
m
e
(
a
s
T
o
c
T
G
f
n
a
t
e
s
T
w
μ
a
T
B
T
w
e
D
p
B
i
R
A
A
B
B
B
C
C
C
D
FR2
IQ θR3 0.5832 0.1515 3.8495
The variables are explained earlier except that two changes
re made in the way that they enter the regression equation above.
he variables wit is the ratio of the price of labour to the price
f deposits. Thus the two input prices are incorporated within
he above variable. Secondly, all variables are transformed into
heir natural logarithm in specifying the regression equation.
Variables CRDit, CRDit, CAPit, and LIQit control for
redit, capital and liquidity risk, respectively. The variables LNit
nd DPit are loans and deposits. The variables T and T2 are linear
nd quadratic time trends, respectively. The random noise terms
re discussed in Section 3 above.
As explained in the text, the Coelli algorithm calculates the
istance from the efficient cost frontier for all banks in the sample
nd the scores are aggregated by bank groups A to E. The scores,
hich lie within the closed set (0, 1) are expressed as percentages
o lie within (0, 100) in the text (Table 4) for different types of
anks.
ppendix B. Theil index of dispersion
Suppose that there are n number of banks. The efficiency
core is y {=y1, . . ., yn}. Then the Theil index (Theil, 1967), can
e written as (Cowell, 1977:55–62):
(y, n) =
(
1
n
){∑{[yi
μ
] [
ln
(
yi
μ
)]}}
(A.2.1)
If the data are classified according to, say ownership type, we
ay wish to know how much of this index is due to differences in
fficiency between types of ownership, say foreign and domestic
inter-group contribution to the total Theil index of dispersion),
nd how much of the index can be attributed to dispersion of
cores amongst each group (intra-group contribution to the total
heil index of dispersion).
Now think of a more general case. Suppose that the number
f banks is n, having scores {yi}= {y1, y2, . . ., yn}. They are
lassified into m mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups.
here are nk banks in each group, where k = 1, 2, . . ., m. In
Ievelopment Finance 2 (2012) 93–99
roup k, the score of the banks is the set {xk1, . . . , xknk}, denoted
or brevity as {xk}. The groups are mutually exclusive, i.e. that
o individual is a member of more than one group. The groups
re also exhaustive, i.e. that the sum of nk for all groups taken
ogether is equal to the total number of banks, n. Exclusivity and
xhaustiveness also imply that the union of the sets {xk} is the
et {yi}.
The MLD index, T(y, n), can be decomposed as follows:
(υ, ν) =
[∑(μκ
μ
)
T (χκ, νκ)
(νκ
ν
)]
+
{∑(μκ
μ
)(
λν
(
μκ
μ
))(νκ
ν
)}
(A.2.2)
here the summation
∑
is over the index k = 1, 2, . . ., m, and
= average of the values {y1, y2, . . ., yn}= (y1 + y2 + · · · + yn)/n,
nd μk = average of the values {xk1, . . . , xknk}.
(xk, nk) =
(
1
nk
){
SUM over nk
{[
xki
μk
][
ln
(
xki
μk
)]}}
The MLD index can be broken down into two parts, A and
, as follows:
(y, n) = A + B,
here A is the term enclosed within [ ] and B is the expression
nclosed in { } in Eq. (A.2.2) above. T is the Mean Logarithmic
eviation measure of dispersion. The first part, A, can be inter-
reted as the “within-group” dispersion and the second part,
, can be regarded as the “between-group” contribution to the
ndex of total dispersion.
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